The Ayyubids were a Kurdish family, originally from present day Armenia, although some of their genealogies trace their roots back to Arab origins much like a seventh/thirteenthcentury genealogy of the Turkoman Rasulids. 2 The Ayyubid military that came to Yemen mainly consisted of a mixture of Turkish and Kurdish groups, often collectively described as ghuzz in texts written by Arab authors. Originally referring to Turkish Oghuz (an already ambiguous term), ghuzz came to be used as an even more general nomenclature for these non-Arab groups. The term ghuzz is found in earlier historical literature of medieval South Arabia. 3 But its use becomes much more prominent in the later part of the medieval period as is found, for example, in the title of the seventh/thirteenth-century chronicle describing the Ayyubid occupation and the reigns of the first two sultans of the subsequent Rasulid dynasty:
The Book of the Valuable Necklace of the Reports of the Ghuzz Kings in Yemen. 4 Henceforth, ghuzz then continues to appear in medieval Yemeni chronicles and administrative texts as a common vague ethnic denominator for soldiers in the militaries of the Ayyubids and Rasulids. 5 Unfortunately, at the same time it also largely obscures a more precise understanding of these soldiers' ethnic identity. Even so, there are, thankfully, some exceptions to this pattern that specifically designate individuals or groups as Kurds (akrād) and Turks (atrāk).
References to specifically Turkish individuals in these medieval texts are regrettably few in number. Nonetheless, they do provide a nuanced, albeit limited, window into the varied roles and alliances they undertook in medieval Yemen. For example, on the one hand, in 601/1205, after the Ayyubids had won a series of battles in the northern highlands, a pro-Ayyubid Turk named Asad al-Dīn Qarāsunqur presented to the Ayyubid ruler Atābak Sunqur a cohort of the Zaydi Imam ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥamza to be expelled from Sa'da. 6 While on the other hand, in 611/1215, the Turkish prince ʿAlim al-Dīn Sunqur was among a group of ghuzz who defected from the Ayyubids and took a pledge with the imam. 7 Beyond the military there are also glimpses into the world of Turkish women in two reports. In 598/1202, a Turkish female slave, along with four marble slabs featuring a picture of an ancient house in Makka, was presented to Zaydi Imam ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥamza by Shihāb al-Jazarī as an act of goodwill after they had formed a new pact. 8 Then, as a possible follow-up in 619/1222, a report mentions the marriage of a Zaydi jurist to a Turkish woman who was among the slaves of the Zaydi imam. 9 In contrast to this small number of explicit mentions of Turks, the larger amount and breadth of references to Kurds in the singular and plural allows for a more extensive examination of what we may understand about the role of this ethnic group in the context of medieval South Arabia. Recent research on Kurds in the medieval period has concentrated on the changes in the usage and meaning of the term over time and geographic space. 10 In the early medieval period, the term Kurd appears to denote ethnographic attributes that reflect a nomadic way of life, but by the fifth/eleventh century it is more clearly utilized as an ethnonym in distinction to, for example, Arabs and Turks. This development may be correlated to the wider role that Kurds played in the politics and society of the Islamic world, as is most clearly evidenced in the rise of the Kurdish Ayyubids, although the dynasty's ethnicity does not seem to have been emphasized until the following Mamluk period. 11 In any case, the emergence of Kurds as an ethnic group in the late medieval period, who were distinguished through their increased agency and involvement in the military and politics, is likewise mirrored in South Arabia. In this case study, I argue that the reason for the higher visibility of the Kurds in Yemeni chronicles is related to their clear, albeit inconsistent, political actions of increased autonomy away from the powerful, yet floundering Ayyubids and Rasulids and their gradual allegiance to the rising Zaydis. In this way, an approach to exploring the Kurds as an ethnic group in South Arabia is through Walter Pohl's focus on situations of conflict described in chronicles as important contexts for tracing medieval ethnic identities through their collective actions.
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More broadly, this relational and interactive approach to ethnicity emerges from Frederick Barth's concept that ethnic groups are primarily maintained through their continual actions to uphold their boundaries against other groups and the state and Thomas Hylland Eriksen's emphasis of ethnicity as developed through joint contact between different groups rather than properties that a group developed on their own. 13 Ethnic identity thus is situational and performative, as well as intersects and overlaps with other types of identity (e.g., religious, familial, regional, etc). 14 For the rest of this article, I will focus on examples in the chronicles of how the Kurds' individual, collaborative, and collective actions within this political arena implicitly built up their ethnic cohesion and increasingly maintained the boundaries of their community until they seemingly disappear from the historical record at the end of the eighth/fourteenth century. During this period the Tihama Plain on the Red Sea coast became the center of Kurdish dissent against the Ayyubids. This is most emphatic in 598/1201 when it was the location, just outside of the city of Zabid, where the Kurds assassinated the Ayyubid ruler al-Muʿizz Ismāʿīl b. Ṭughtakīn. 19 It is reported that a Kurdish man named Hindawh and his brother knocked the sultan from his mule, beat him with his own sword, and then beheaded him. The strong hatred by the Kurds in this region toward al-Muʿizz is clearly palpable as the two men were neither condemned by his soldiers nor the other Kurds. Rather, only the personal servant of al-Muʿizz had to be chased down and slain. Furthermore, upon their arrival back to Zabid, it is described that when his decapitated head was presented, a Kurdish woman rotated it to the right and left and then slapped his cheek and face. It is then explained that not only was she was the wife of one of the men who killed al-Muʿizz, but also that she had encouraged it because he had slain their son shortly before his own death. Following this assassination, Atābak Sunqur, the next Ayyubid ruler in Yemen, initially made peace with the Kurds and did not punish them, largely due to the fact that al-Muʿizz himself wanted to kill Sunqur right before his death. But after a few years, dissension within the Ayyubids grew, as demonstrated by a new alliance that had formed between Shihāb al-Jazarī, an Ayyubid prince in Sanaa, and the Zaydi Imam ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥamza in 958/1202. At these meetings, Hishām, a Kurd who was assisting the prince, presented robes to the imam. 15 Ibn Ḥātim, ed. Smith, [45] [46] [47] [48] ed. Smith, 46. 17 Ibn Ḥātim, ed. Smith, [57] [58] [59] [60] [62] [63] [64] 18 Ibn Ḥātim, Kitāb al-simṭ, ed. Smith, 67. The vowelization of his name is uncertain.
Fickle Mercenaries
19 Ibn Ḥātim, ed. Smith, [80] [81] [82] [83] [92] [93] 63; Anonymous, 3; ed. ʿĀshūr, [357] [358] During this visit the Kurds grew suspicious and mistakenly believed the soldiers instead had been summoned in order to seize them. As a result, in the middle of the night the Kurds first incapacitated the horses at the garrison's camp outside of the city, and then proceeded to besiege the palace of the sultan at the city gate where al-Tughrī was boarded. At first, the Rasulid soldiers were able to drive the Kurds away, but eventually the majority of the soldiers dispersed after al-Tughrī refused multiple requests to retreat with them. In the morning, al-Tughrī finally emerged from the palace under the pretense of a truce with the Kurds, but was quickly slaughtered along with his brother-in-law, his secretary, the governor (wālī) of Dhamar, and four remaining soldiers. Afterwards, the Kurds pillaged the abandoned military camp and took all of their horses and equipment. When the fleeing soldiers reached Sultan al-Mu � ayyad in the Rasulid capital of Ta'izz, he compensated them for their losses and prepared a double-pronged attack involving Rasulid forces coming from the north and south. When they arrived back to Dhamar, however, they discovered that the Kurds had fled to Wādī al-Ḥarr in the northern part of the Dhamar Plain as well as had taken over and provisioned the nearby fortress of Hirrān. For three days a battle ensued until the Kurds fled to the north and the Rasulid armies returned to Dhamar. During this time, however, the Kurds also had been in correspondence with the Zaydi Imam Muḥammad b. al-Muṭahhar. Hearing of the conflict, his forces, composed of local Arab tribes, had also begun to attack Sanaa. Hence, even after the sultan finally arrived to stabilize first Dhamar and then Sanaa, the Rasulids had to continue to fight with the colluding Kurds and Zaydis for the remainder of the year at various locations in the northern highlands.
Not until October of 710/1310 was a truce made between Sultan al-Mu � ayyad and the Kurds, who finally submitted on the condition that they could continue to occupy the fortress of Hirrān near Dhamar in exchange for five hostages to remain with the Rasulids in Lower Yemen. 28 Two years later, however, a separate peace agreement was reached between Imam Muḥammad b. al-Muṭahhar and Sultan al-Mu�ayyad. This removed any protection the Zaydi imam provided for the Kurds, making them vulnerable to further attacks by the Rasulids. Consequently, in 712/1312, Sultan al-Mu�ayyad arrived with two hundred horsemen and a contingent of Arab foot soldiers, and was also joined by a Rasulid officer who brought his own forces from Sanaa. 29 In response, the Kurds sought out a local Arab shaykh to intervene, and a truce was settled based on the conditions that reveal further details of their, at least current, geographical distribution. First, the Kurds should not enter Dhamar nor the nearby town of Rada' to the east. Second, the Kurds must evacuate the province of Sanaa. And, third, their hostages should still remain with the Rasulids at al-ʿArūs. After this agreement was settled, Sultan al-Mu �ayyad sent a new governor to Dhamar. In the following year, however, the sultan was still not satisfied, although unfortunately no details are given in the chronicles as to why. He ordered his governor to attack the Hirrān citadel using a catapult, resulting in its destruction. 30 While the Kurds murdered the governor of Sanaa in retaliation, they once again decided to surrender unconditionally. This time another Arab shaykh wrote on their behalf to the sultan, who in turn granted them amnesty, and the Kurds returned to Dhamar. In this series of episodes, it is clear that the Kurds at this point have well-established themselves in the central highlands as a powerful, although not yet fully autonomous, population. While they were making new alliances with the Zaydis, evidently these were not very strong ones. Over the next few decades, however, the Kurds went on to situate themselves as more independent mercenaries that fought for both of the opposing forces of the Rasulids and Zaydis. In this way, they begin to appear to act along more pragmatic lines instead of showing consistent loyalty to any other group, much like the ambivalent actions of various Arab tribes at this time. In 723/1323, for instance, a large force of Kurds joined a rebellious Rasulid prince in his siege of Ta'izz against the new Sultan al-Mujāhid. 31 reason by the author of the chronicle, in this passage, instead of using the more broad term of ghuzz, specific ethnonyms are given for both the Kurds and Turks. Yet, a turning point in the relationship between the Kurds and the Rasulids came in the next decade in 739/1338, when a second rebellion took place in Dhamar. 35 In an apparent response to local unrest not directly reported in the chronicles, Sultan al-Mujāhid sent to Dhamar four hundred horsemen and eleven thousand foot soldiers equipped with a catapult, who successfully retook control of the city and the nearby fortress of Hirrān. Nonetheless, [146] [147] 277; [464] [465] 31 Al-Khazrajī, Al-ʿuqūd al-lu�lu�iyya, ed. al-Ḥibshī, 519. afterwards, a new governor was appointed whose conduct was so bad that it provoked another much more successful rebellion. After the Kurds drove the governor away back to Ta'izz, the Rasulids did not return to Dhamar, except for one unsuccessful punitive campaign into the region almost forty years later. Thus, from here, a new phase began for the Kurds as they increasingly became intertwined with the Zaydis, although did not yet entirely disassociate themselves from the Rasulids.
Bifurcation and Reorientation
As we move into this phase, reports from Zaydi biographies and chronicles as an additional source to the Rasulid texts, allow us to understand the structure and non-military practices of the Kurdish population with a bit more depth. While the Zaydi imams had been intermittently making attempts to establish their own authority in the Dhamar Plain since the arrival of the first Imam al-Hādī in 284/897, not until the mid-eighth/fourteenth century were more measured strategies attempted. -tārīkh al-ḥadīth, 185) . Additionally, it is should be emphasized that the descriptions of these two factions as »Banī«, possibly insinuating that they had a type of tribal or genealogical structure, should be received with caution because this descriptor comes from a Yemeni historian and not the Kurds themselves. How they precisely called and conceived of the division and composition of these two groups remains unknown. 
Layered Agency and Apparent Assimilation
The case of Kurds in medieval South Arabia provides a unique historiographic reconstruction of the appearance and disappearance of an ethnic group. While it may be attributed to the various ways different historians wrote their histories, a fascinating build-up can be seen in the story of their accumulative agency as a political force. In the beginning, reports are mainly framed around Kurdish individuals, separately and in collaborative action, at first absconding away from their military allegiances to the Ayyubids and then outright rebelling against them. In the second act, the Kurdish community as a whole is described as revolting against the Rasulid governors and sultans until they effectively achieved independence. Then, in the final act, separate groups within the Kurdish community are revealed to be in dispute, which leads them seek outside resolution from the Zaydis. Hence, there appears to be a clear historicity for the diverse layers of agency and people within the Kurdish community, interacting with themselves and outsiders, as it slowly cohered together. Boundaries for this ethnic group were laid down and repeatedly fought for as their political currency rose in diverse conflicts across South Arabia. So, what happened to the Kurds? Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a clear answer to this question. But an educated guess may be offered based on their overall narrative arc as found in the chronicles. After the Kurds initial entrance into South Arabia as professional soldiers, reports show their gradual distancing from acting as subordinates to the Ayyubids and Rasulids, and slow development into establishing a more independent autonomy in the central highlands. Here they increasingly appear to act with no clear loyalties within the political landscape in a way that echoes the pragmatism of the local Arab tribes in the chronicles. Soon, however, there are descriptions from Zaydi sources of the bifurcation of the Kurdish population into the Banī Asad and the Banī Shukr, and then the integration of the former with the Zaydis through political truces and marriage, which is emphasized in the final report about them. Hence, in the broader terms, it may be proposed that the Kurds became assimilated and absorbed into Yemeni society where their ethnicity no longer was an important part of their identity nor directly connected to their actions. This sort of social transformation is described in earlier works of Yemeni history, where a tribe merged or became absorbed into another tribe. 47 Here I do not wish to conflate the ideas of an ethnic group and tribe in the South Arabian context, but rather merely emphasize the concept of social assimilation and absorption to have precedent in this history. 48 Thus, this relatively short window of explicit reports seems to point to an overall story of the emergence, cohesion, and eventual dissolution of the Kurds as a specific ethnic group within Yemeni society as a whole.
